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ABSTRACT
In 1939, agents of the D Section of British Secret Service MI6 started to build a secret 
sabotage and intelligence organization in Yugoslavia directed against Nazi Germany and 
Fascist Italy. The article identifies various actors of the network who developed cross-
border links into Italy as well as into former Austria. The focus lies on two types of 
activist: German intellectuals in Yugoslavia and actors from the Slovene- and German- 
speaking mixed populations in the borderland of former Austria, Slovenia and Italy. In 
contesting older national historical interpretations, the set up is characterized as a trans-
national subversive network aiming at the transfer of spirit, knowledge and techniques of 
Anti-German resistance. Furthermore, the article analyses the proceedings of a German 
trial in 1941 which reconstructed the network as a communist endeavour lead by British 
Jews. The article concludes by investigating how the executions of members of the sabo-
tage organisation had been dealt with in Austria after 1945.
Key words: MI6, SOE, TIGR, German exile, Austria, Carinthian Slovenes, resistance, 
pre-war Yugoslavia, politics of the past
RESISTENZA TRANSNAZIONALE NELL’AREA DELL’ALPE-ADRIA NEL 
1939/40. ATTIVISTI TRANSFRONTALIERI SOVVERSIVI, INTERPRETAZIONI 
STORICHE, POLITICHE E NAZIONALI DEL PASSATO
SINTESI
Nel 1939, gli agenti della sezione D dei Servizi segreti britannici MI6 cominciarono 
a tessere un’organizzazione segreta di sabotaggio e intelligence in Jugoslavia, diretta 
contro la Germania nazista e l’Italia fascista. Il presente contributo individua i diversi 
protagonisti della rete, che stabilì collegamenti transfrontalieri con l’Italia e l’ex-Aus-
tria, e si incentra su due tipi di attivisti: gli intellettuali tedeschi in Jugoslavia e gli attori 
1 This article is based on the author’s research within the context of the project "The Austrian Section of 
SOE. Policy, Personnel, Missions, Memory" at the Department of Government at the University of Vienna 
(supervisor: Ao.Univ.-Prof. Dr. Walter Manoschek). Research was funded by the Austrian Science Fund 
(FWF). All quotations from German and Austrian sources were translated into English by the author.
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appartenenti alla popolazione mista di slovenofoni e germanofoni nelle terre di confine 
dell-ex Austria, Slovenia e Italia. Impugnando le vecchie interpretazioni storiche nazi-
onali, vi si espone la struttura dell’organizzazione quale rete sovversiva transnazionale 
che mirava a trasmettere lo spirito, il sapere e le tecniche della resistenza antitedesca. 
Inoltre, il contributo analizza gli atti di un processo tedesco del 1941 che presentò e 
ricostruì la rete come un tentativo comunista guidato dagli ebrei britannici. Il contributo 
si conclude con un’indagine su come l’Austria abbia affrontato il tema dei membri giusti-
ziati dell’organizzazione di sabotaggio dopo il 1945.
Parole chiave: MI6, SOE, TIGR, esilio tedesco, Austria, sloveni della Carinzia, resist-
enza, Jugoslavia prebellica, politiche del passato
INTRODUCTION
In late 1941, an official at the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Of-
fice) noted that, compared to the 'Altreich' [...] Ostmark was significantly more important 
in terms of sabotage policing, as foreign intelligence services and local resistance groups 
had already understood the need to build sabotage organizations that sprang into action 
once the war began, particularly after the start of military operations in the East".2 Apart 
from the Czech section of the underground Communist Party of Austria, which perpe-
trated 47 arson and bomb attacks around Vienna after the war began (Neugebauer, 2008, 
84) and a "train sabotage organization in Carinthia and Styria" that had been exposed in 
the fall of 1941, the analysis – particularly the reference to "foreign intelligence services" 
– referred to a cross-border sabotage organization active between summer 1939 and sum-
mer 1940 in Yugoslavia, Italy and the territory formerly known as Austria ("Ostmark"). 
The latter of these organizations is the subject of this article. Before expounding on this 
further, it is necessary to take a brief look at the geopolitical background: The initial phase 
of British subversive warfare against Germany from Yugoslavia lasted from the summer 
of 1939 (the start of the war) to the summer of 1940. It occurred against the background of 
an indirectly led struggle between Great Britain and the Axis powers, the focus of which 
centered on drawing Yugoslavia into the respective system of alliances or at least prevent-
ing it from being taken into the opposing camp (Pirjevec, 2010, 34; Vodušek Starič, 2005, 
33; Pirker, 2010, 115).
Great Britain was in a difficult position from the start: As opposed to Germany and 
Italy, Great Britain had only had a very weak economic and political presence in Yugosla-
via in 1939 (Barker, 1976, 28; Knoll, 1986, 9; Suppan, 1996, 297). With the annexation of 
Austria into the German Reich, German intelligence services – many of them headed by 
Austrians (the Germans regarded Austrians as "experts" on the Balkans) – moved directly 
2 DÖW, a. u. 1444, Geheime Staatspolizei, Tätigkeit der Kommunisten in Deutschland und in den von 
Deutschland besetzten Gebieten nach Beginn des Krieges mit der Sowjetunion, [1941].
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to the Yugoslavian border. Shortly thereafter, the British Secret Intelligence Service’s 
(SIS – MI6) D Section, which was formed in April 1938 for the purpose of subversive-
militant suppression of Nazi Germany, initiated its assault on German ascendancy. For 
this mission, D Section agents sought alliances with anti-fascist and anti-German forces 
on a local level in various European countries, including exiles from those where the 
Nazis had already seized power.
In adopting recent theoretical discussions (Calvin, 2005, 423; Patel, 2008, 69), I char-
acterize these networks as "transnational" in three respects. First, the connections crossed 
national borders and linked anti-fascists from diverse national communities. In many 
cases, subversive, transborder connections were established by activists with life experi-
ences that allowed them to operate in different national contexts and transfer knowledge 
and techniques for sabotage and subversion. Second, with a view on the institutional 
structure, it can be stated that a wide range of different affiliations or institutional loyalties 
were connected: state-driven secret services, non-state cultural associations with links 
to underground political groups, intellectuals and journalists, political activists in exile, 
refugees and Wehrmacht deserters, and individuals who simply supported efforts out of 
friendship or kinship. Third, for most of the activists, a nation state remained their central 
frame of reference and pole of loyalty.
The D Section was also active in other European countries, but nowhere as inten-
sively as in Yugoslavia. In a situation of overwhelming German domination across the 
continent, the D Section made a conscious effort to spread the spirit of resistance and 
to show that Germany was vulnerable. The British agents’ interventions ranged from 
systematic defamation of pro-German and German businessmen and politicians to anti-
German propaganda, all the way to sabotage and politically subversive actions such as 
organizing anti-German demonstrations or supplying TIGR, the liberal-national Slove-
nian underground organization, with explosives, weapons, and money (Barker, 1976, 
30). The only sabotage methods considered taboo included poisoning the water supply, 
spreading bacteria, and similar acts of biological warfare directed against human beings, 
though instigating the importation of foot-and-mouth disease and potato plague seemed 
as self-evidently to be a part of the D Section’s activities as the attacks on transportation 
lines, power plants, and production centers.3 For the D Section, Yugoslavia also became 
important as an experimental field for testing various methods of subversive and irregular 
warfare in which the previous secret services had no experience, and to prove the effec-
tiveness and suitability of these means in foreign affairs.4 The involvement of government 
officials was crucial to the relatively intense subversive struggle against Germany in Yu-
goslavia. Unlike the situation in other neutral countries such as Switzerland or Sweden, 
in 1939/40 D Section agents and their local and exiled allies in Yugoslavia could count on 
the partial support and backing from the state apparatus, particularly that of the Ministry 
of the Interior and the UJKA, the Yugoslav counterintelligence (Bajc, 2002, 370; Biber, 
2000, 233).5
3 TNA-HS 7/4, History 3A, D Section, Slovene Organization; cf. Onslow, 2005.
4 TNA-HS 7/3, D Section, Balkans, Early History to September 1940.
5 Police in Sweden and Switzerland cracked down on every attempt to sabotage German property. In Swe-
Peter PIRKER: TRANSNATIONAL RESISTANCE IN THE ALPS-ADRIATIC-AREA IN 1939/40 ...,  765–788
768
ACTA HISTRIAE • 20 • 2012 • 4
I will not be entering a more detailed analysis of the D Section’s Balkan division and 
its "Slovene organization" here, nor will I be reconstructing events as they appear in D 
Section sources. These (and the TIGR) have already been addressed in a number of pub-
lications (e.g. cf. Pirker, 2010; Ferenc, 1977; Wohinz, Pirjevec, 1998, 58; Bajc, 2002).6 
Instead, I would like to provide a brief overview before directing attention to two protago-
nists of German origin who have received little consideration in previous research, but 
whose activities highlight the transnational character of this organization pitted against 
Germany’s policy of expansion. Furthermore, I will attempt – on the basis of German 
court records and a RSHA study – to give an assessment of those individuals, who coop-
erated in the "Ostmark" with Slovenian activists from the Slovenian Littoral (Primorska). 
In doing so I problematize the assessments given in the historiography to date, by which 
activists in the "Ostmark" were classifiable as TIGR or could be considered representative 
of early Slovenian resistance in Carinthia. Both of the groups mentioned here are, in my 
opinion, examples of exceptions for the 1939–1941 time period – for both the German-
speaking exile as a whole and for Nazi opponents within the German Reich –, and cannot 
be understood without the background of British organization and instigation. There are, 
however, also individuals within the second group that do not fit the profile of militant 
resistance fighters, but who were nonetheless mercilessly persecuted by Nazi authorities. 
The decisive factor in the persecution of these individuals had less to do with verifiable, 
concrete activity than with the Nazi regime’s particular aim to relentlessly pursue any 
kind of resistance or noncompliance on the "home front", even in the heyday of blitzkrieg. 
This becomes especially clear in an analysis of the Reich’s wartime judicial proceedings 
from July 1941 in Klagenfurt. It should also enable some comparative observations on 
the special military tribunal held on December 1941 in Trieste against the Slovenian anti-
fascists, which was also related to the transnational sabotage organization’s exposure. In 
the last section, I will address the way in which the murdered resistance fighters of the 
sabotage organization were dealt with in Austria after 1945. 
THE TRANSNATIONAL SABOTAGE ORGANIZATION IN 1939/40 AND ITS DIS-
COVERY
In early June 1940, the RSHA in Berlin quickly formed a special commission to inves-
tigate sabotage in the "Ostmark" and in Yugoslavia.7 Within a few weeks, there had been 
four explosives attacks on a war-critical railway line between the Silesian coalfields and 
Italy (Southern Railway), three near the Styrian town of Judenburg and the other close 
to Tarvisio. Prior investigations revealed that, like those that had already been used for 
den, for example, German maritime trade unionist Hermann Knüfken was arrested in November 1939 for 
working with the D Section on the sabotage of German ore transports. Knüfken sat in Swedish prisons until 
1944 (Nelles, 2001, 320; Knüfken, 2008).
6 One key D Section document has already been published in part in: Pirjevec, 2000. For a literary approach 
see: Pahor, 2009.
7 PA-AA, a. u. R 100734, RSHA IV A 2, Vol. 3362/40g tied to IV A 2a – Vol. 722/40 gRs., Sabotage und 
Terrororganisation in der Ostmark, Berlin, 28. 12. 1940.
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anti-German sabotage in Norway, the detonator caps had been manufactured in England. 
The Reichsbahn had already been forced to put more and more freight trains coming out 
of Yugoslavia out of commission due to broken axle bearings. Numerous reports from SD 
and Gestapo informants in Graz and Klagenfurt, as well as German agents in Yugoslavia, 
had come to form a picture that the public mood in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia – particu-
larly in Slovenia – revealed an increasingly open anti-German sentiment.
In addition to this, there had also been a pile of reports concerning arson attacks on 
German warehouses, acts of sabotage to factories that produced for Germany and on 
transport routes essential for supplying the German armaments industry with raw mate-
rials.8 A summary report dated late February 1940 from the Foreign Affairs Department 
of the Security Service (SD) states: "Since the annexation of Austria to the Reich […] we 
have observed lively activity from the English [intelligence] in Yugoslavia, especially in 
Slovenia and Croatia. […] In making use of all anti-German circles, the English intel-
ligence agency has found an excellent means for facilitating its work in Yugoslavia. It 
avails itself of the numerous Jews, particularly in Zagreb, the Slovenian jingoists and the 
Czech, Polish, and Russian émigrés".9
Yet the crucial information on cross-border sabotage efforts came from the Abwehr 
substation in Klagenfurt, which was headed by prominent Carinthian Nazi (and German 
national post-war activist) Karl Fritz.10 Fritz informed the Gestapo about the smuggling of 
explosives across the Karavanke, a matter that (due to a double agent) his own organiza-
tion had been involved in since at least April 1940. The agent in question was Alexander 
Herbst, a junk goods dealer with multiple criminal convictions and a number of solid, 
if not always legal, business contacts in the Alps-Adriatic region. Herbst had already 
worked as a confidant for the Austrian Kriminalpolizei prior to 1938 and had been acting 
as a courier and buyer for the Abwehr station in Salzburg since the fall of 1939.11 Once 
an Abwehr substation had been formed under Fritz, Herbst served as its informant for the 
infiltration of Nazi opponents in the "Ostmark" and in Slovenia.12
8 The reports can be found in the Himmler Collection: NARA-RG 242, Entry (E) 27, Box (B) 19a.
9 NARA-RG 242, E 27, B 19a, Folder (F) 173-b-20-12/1, VI D 2, Yugoslavia, 26. 2. 1940.
10 The Salzburg Abwehr station was responsible for combating attacks of espionage, sabotage and disruption 
on troops and all relevant bodies of the national defense military district XVIII (Styria, Carinthia, Tyrol, 
Salzburg) (Brammer, 1989, 11). For more on the Abwehr substations in Klagenfurt and Graz, see: Vodušek 
Starič, 2002. According to Fritz, the Abwehr substation in Klagenfurt was created "due to the tense situation 
with Yugoslavia". (KLA-LGK, a. u. 20Vr1923/46, Staatspolizei, Niederschrift mit Karl Fritz, 11. 6. 1946). 
The Wehrmacht Archive in Klagenfurt was a hidden outpost for German intelligence, presumably for the 
SD Foreign Intelligence Service. Besides information gathering, the SD also kept watch on the Yugoslavian 
consulate. It did, however, also have co-operators which provided the Yugoslavians with information as 
to the identity of German agents in Slovenia. It is along these lines that Emil Wedam, interpreter for the 
Wehrmacht Archive, and Maria Tomasch (his liason to the Yugoslavian posts) were sentenced to death for 
treason by the People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof) and executed in May of 1943 (SDB, a. u. Urteil 6L 42/43 
– 2J 462/41g, Volksgerichtshof, Urteil gegen Emil Wedam und Maria Tomasch, 14. 5. 1943).
11  KLA-LGK, a. u. 20Vr1925/46, Letter from Alexander Herbst to investigative judge Dr. Philadelphy, Kla-
genfurt 16. 12. 1946.
12 KLA-LGK, a. u. 20Vr1923/46, Staatspolizei, Niederschrift mit Karl Fritz, 11. 6. 1946.
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In Klagenfurt, Herbst succeeded in convincing Yugoslavian consulate official Karl 
Širok of his desire to participate in the anti-German struggle. Širok integrated Herbst into 
the sabotage network, where he connected him with a subversive "border runner" by the 
name of Anton Ivančič. The connection to Ivančič precipitated in at least three meetings 
between Herbst, a second Klagenfurt double agent and Slovenian activists in the sabotage 
network (besides Ivančič, Ferdo Kravanja and Danilo Zelen) on the Wurzenpass. Result-
ing from these, Herbst was put in charge of explosives materials, weapons and money for 
attacks he had supposedly planned himself; in reality, he delivered the material to Karl 
Fritz. All of this information from the Abwehr substation Klagenfurt – Širok also gave 
Herbst the name of Ivan Rudolf, director of the Slovenian organization "Bran-i-bor" and 
a central liaison for the D Section in Ljubljana – alerted the RSHA to the existence of 
a larger, transnational subversive organization. Reinhard Heydrich, head of the RSHA, 
sent his special commission to Yugoslavia twice in the summer of 1940 in an attempt to 
capture "saboteurs and terrorists", as well as the "supporters and initiators" presumed to 
be among the members of the British community in Yugoslavia and among Yugoslavian 
security authorities.
The latter was obvious due to the involvement of Karl Širok. Exiled Austrians in Yu-
goslavia came less into question as organizers, as the foreign bureau of the Revolutionary 
Socialists of Austria in Maribor had been banned since Hans Hladnik’s13 escape to Eng-
land in the spring of 1939, and by 1939, the KPÖ underground border-running organiza-
tions had for the most part been crushed (Halbrainer, 2010, 45). In late December 1940, 
the RSHA special commission summarized the findings of investigations and police inter-
rogations in Styria, Carinthia and Yugoslavia in a 200-page secret police study entitled 
"Sabotage and Terrorist Organization in Ostmark".14 The study reveals how the primary 
purpose of the RSHA’s intervention in Yugoslavia was to purge the Yugoslavian police 
and security apparatus of anti-German and British influence. Though the commission 
report complains about the inadequate, only pretended full cooperation of Yugoslavian 
agents, the Yugoslavian head of government Dragisa Cvetković did respond to German 
pressure by removing the pro-British Minister of the Interior Stanoje Mihaldžić from 
office, interning politically active Slovene exiles from northeast Italy, indicting several 
of the TIGR’s most active members and expelling scores of British citizens and German 
exiles suspected of belonging to the sabotage organization.
13 Styrian socialist and trade unionist Hans Hladnik had been smuggling illegal socialist propaganda (in-
cluding the Arbeiter Zeitung) from Marburg into Austria since 1934 under the tolerance of Yugoslavian 
authorities. Hladnik had already left for England in the spring of 1939, probably because he saw no possible 
way to continue his operations. In England he was registered as a refugee in 1939, in other words before the 
D Section became active in Yugoslavia. Hladnik was later employed by the Austrian Section of the British 
Special Operations Executive (TNA-HS-9/717/2, Personnel File – PF – Hans Hladnik).
14 PA-AA,. a. u. R 100734, RSHA IV A 2, Vol. 3362/40g tied to IV A 2a – Vol. 722/40 gRs., Sabotage und 
Terrororganisation in der Ostmark, Berlin, 28. 12. 1940.
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THE ROLE OF GERMAN EXILES
The RSHA study makes no mention of the part German-speaking exiles played in the 
early militant anti-German resistance. Based on British files, the following pages will 
investigate who the most important German-speaking exiles in this transnational sub-
versive network were and what roles they assumed in these operations. First, we would 
have to begin by naming Julius Hanau as a central and inspiring figure in the D Section 
in Yugoslavia.15 Hanau was from a South African Jewish family, he was a British citizen 
and had converted to the Anglican Church. Since the end of the First World War, during 
which he had served as a British soldier, he had lived as a successful businessman and 
legal adviser in Belgrade. Hanau was a well-traveled man: He was familiar with all of 
the European countries, including Russia, and his journeys had taken him everywhere 
from South and North America to North and South Africa. Besides English, he spoke 
fluent French, Serbian, Spanish, Dutch and Zulu. Hanau had excellent political contacts 
in Belgrade and quickly came to the attention of German agents, to which he evidently 
embodied the prototypical, anti-Semitic cliché of a Jewish string-puller with designs on 
world domination. Hanau knew how to protect himself: When he was denounced as a 
British agent in the 17 December 1939 edition of the Völkische Beobachter, the issue was 
confiscated in Yugoslavia.16
Besides Britons employed in both diplomatic and cultural institutions and business-
es, Hanau’s organization also included Yugoslavian businesspeople, language teachers, 
journalists, politicians, and intellectuals as well as Polish, Czechoslovakian, and German 
refugees. Organizational bases for the several, largely autonomous cells in the network 
emerged in Ljubljana, Maribor, Zagreb, and Belgrade. With the help of German Social 
Democrat Jakob Altmaier, Hanau also enjoyed the support of one of the most renowned 
journalists in the Weimar Republic. Altmaier had, among others, written for Kurt Tuchol-
sky’s Weltbühne, the Manchester Guardian as its German correspondent, for the Sozial-
demokratischer Pressedienst and had reported for the Vorwärts out of Belgrade, Paris and 
London. The National Socialist takeover and the regime’s anti-Semitic politics forced 
Altmaier to leave the country. Between 1933 and 1937, he reported for the Manchester 
Guardian and Le Populaire – mostly from Paris, but also over the course of several stays 
in Yugoslavia, primarily in Belgrade – followed by several reports from Spain on the 
raging civil war between Fascists and Republicans. Altmaier had already contributed to 
British-backed, anti-fascist exile resistance efforts in the spring of 1938, when he coop-
erated with the "Sender der Deutschen Freiheitspartei" (German Freedom Party Radio). 
Based on a British ship in the English Channel, resistance activists broadcast to Germany 
in an attempt to enlighten the German population about the "true nature of the NSDAP". 
Among other things, the station reported on the German "Legion Condor" and its contri-
bution to the Spanish Civil War, which the Nazi regime denied (Watt, 1991). It is possible 
that Altmaier’s association with the new British institutions for psychological and sub-
15 TNA-HS 9/653/2, PF Julius Hanau.
16 NARA-RG 242, E 27, B 19a, F 173-b-20-12/1, VM 6786, Transcript, Belgrade, n.d.
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versive warfare developed from journalistic connections. A number of British journalists 
were involved in the psychological warfare efforts or propaganda offices, many of them 
former correspondents on the continent. When exactly Altmaier defected from Paris to 
Belgrade is unclear. He did, in any event, have close contacts within the Serbian Agrar-
ian party in Serbia. He supported its program of a South Slav federation of Serbs, Croats, 
Slovenes and Bulgarians on the basis of rural cooperatives (Moß, 2003, 163).17
The Serbian Agrarian party opposed the Yugoslavian government’s dependence on 
the Axis powers and advocated an alliance with Britain and the Soviet Union, making 
them especially interesting to the D Section as a partner. Altmaier put D Section agents in 
contact with its leading politician Milan Gavrilović, and transferred his wealth of knowl-
edge to this transnational subversive context: Besides his command of languages, social 
skills, political contacts, and journalistic brilliance, Altmaier’s own revolutionary experi-
ences from November of 1918 in Frankfurt and German social democratic party propa-
ganda proved helpful to this end.
A second German exile, agricultural economist Alfred Becker (born 1898) of Meck-
lenburg, assumed a very similar mediating and translating role. Becker may have been 
even more directly and intensively involved with Hanau’s subversive activities than Alt-
maier – he had a personnel file with the D Section and the Special Operations Executive 
(SOE), its successor organization. Becker had also been a child of the German social de-
mocracy. His father, Lord of the Manor Arthur Becker, had played a key role in the Revo-
lution of 1918 in Pomerania, served as an SPD representative official for land reform 
and was active in the German League for Human Rights (Wilhelmus, 2007, 67). Like his 
father, Becker vehemently opposed Prussian Junkerdom. He was driven out of house and 
home when the NSDAP seized power and he fled to Yugoslavia via the Netherlands and 
France. Becker had been living in Yugoslavia with his family since 1936 and conducted 
scientific experiments for the Yugoslavian Ministry of Agriculture. He evidently offered 
his services to British representatives in Belgrade as early as May of 1939, in other words 
before the start of the war, and was recruited by Hanau the following fall.18 Becker identi-
fied himself politically as a Social Democrat and wrote in his résumé regarding his "ex-
traction": "Because these things play a role today: I am a so-called ‘non-Arian’".19
In all likelihood, Becker and Altmaier worked together in the fall of 1939 on the 
anti-Nazi Croatian-language magazine Alarm, anti-Nazi pamphlets addressing Danube 
Swabians as well as other anti-Nazi (and also anti-communist) fliers in editions of up to 
10,000. The two social democratic exiles were further responsible for the production of 
the German newspaper Deutsche Mitteilungen and Srpski informacije, its Serbian coun-
terpart.20 Once the illegal propaganda work in Croatia and Serbia was taken over by local 
partners, Altmaier and Becker increasingly turned their attention to producing German-
17 Altmaier was to return to Germany in 1949, even though the majority of his family had been murdered 
in Nazi concentration camps. The only Jewish member of the Bundestag (SPD), he negotiated the 1952 
Luxemburg "Restitution Agreement" between Germany and Israel (cf. von Jena, 1986).
18 TNA-HS 9/112/4, PF Alfred Becker, Record Sheet, 14. 3. 1945.
19 TNA-HS 9/112/4, PF Alfred Becker, Vita Alfred Heinrich Hugo Julius Becker, 23. 5. 1939.
20 TNA-HS 7/4, History 3A, D section, Slovene Organization.
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language social democratic and Catholic propaganda, which was then smuggled to Aus-
tria and Germany via Slovenia and Hungary.21 In late January 1940, Becker was appre-
hended by the Belgrade police for the distribution of illegal propaganda. Though Hanau 
managed to secure his propagandist’s speedy release, he did instruct Becker to avoid any 
direct contact with him for a while. At the same time, according to Hanau, Becker could 
continue his work, "which is indispensable to our Deutsche Mitteilungen and socialist 
propaganda going into Austria".22 Becker was also directly involved in acts of sabotage, 
including infecting Germany-bound cattle deliveries with foot-and-mouth disease.23
What was more effective and sustainable was Becker’s liaison work in Ljubljana, 
where Hanau sent him in December 1939 to help build a Slovenian organization for 
the D Section.24 Becker is said to have acquainted Hanau with leading activists of the 
anti-fascist, national-liberal Slovenian underground in the Littoral (Primorska), including 
Albert Rejec. Rejec took over the task of expanding the D Section’s propaganda and sabo-
tage network in the "Ostmark" (Earle, 2005, 26). Similar to Altmaier in the case of the 
Serbian opposition, Becker served as a middleman between British D Section agents and 
the Slovenian anti-fascist underground on both sides of the Yugoslavian-Italian border. 
An evaluation of Becker’s work for the D Section shows particular appreciation for his 
ability to direct the Slovenian activists to intervene in Austria: "Assisted greatly in secur-
ing the collaboration of SLOVENE émigrés from ISTRIA who were used for propaganda 
and sabotage in Austria".25
Altmaier and Becker were among the few German exiles prepared to fight Nazi Ger-
many on the side of the Western powers immediately after the war began, also using 
military means. Other examples include Karl Retzlaw, the former Spartakist, KPD co-
founder/co-operator and Komintern dissenter (one of the same politically stateless profes-
sional revolutionaries Manès Sperber so impressively describes in his "Like a Tear in the 
Ocean"); the later editor of the Frankfurter Rundschau Karl Gerold26 and Gregor Sebba, a 
Viennese political scientist (Pirker, 2010, 52; Pirker, 2009, 253).27
What purpose did these activities by subversive intellectuals in exile serve, where did 
their value lie? Sabotage could do nothing to stop Germany in 1940; its players were of 
21 TNA-HS 9/112/4, PF Alfred Becker, Yugoslavia, 23. 3. 1940.
22 TNA-HS 9/112/4, PF Alfred Becker, From Caesar [Hanau] to D. H., 1. 2. 1940.
23 Confirmation of this can be found in a letter from the District Authority of Cilli to all commanders of police 
stations in Slovenia, dated 3. 2. 1940 (NARA, RG 242, E 27, B 19a, F 173-b-20-12/1, Abschrift der Über-
setzung, Bez. Hauptmannschaft Cilli an alle Kommandanten der Gendarmerieposten, Vert. Zl. 135/1, 3. 2. 
1940).
24 TNA-HS-9/112/4, PF Alfred Becker, From Caesar [Hanau] to D. H., 1. 2. 1940.
25 TNA-HS-9/112/4, PF Alfred Becker, Record Sheet, 14. 3. 1945. On the network in Slovenia see Pirker, 
2010, 138.
26 Retzlaw and Gerold founded the militant underground group LEX from French and Swiss exile. The group 
cooperated with the D Section/SOE in sabotage and propaganda efforts within the Third Reich between 
1939 and 1944 (cf. Pirker, 2010, 93). With regard to regular warfare, one would have to note the German-
speaking defectors in the British army, who served in the war against Germany from France in 1940 (cf. 
Sanders, 2008). 
27 For the collaboration of German seamen with the D Section see Nelles, 2001.
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course aware of that. The D Section files show time and again that these subversive acts 
were viewed as having the moral value of showing and encouraging an assiduous spirit 
of resistance against Germany. The D Section’s organization in Yugoslavia was largely 
destroyed by RSHA interventions in the July of 1940. Altmaier and Becker had to once 
again take a step back from the Nazis. This is not to say that they abandoned the struggle; 
both continued – in the "no surrender" sense of the word – the fight against Germany with 
the SOE, which was established in July 1940 by Winston Churchill as a means of rein-
forcing the subversive warfare. Altmaier did this first as a propagandist in Greece, later as 
a Balkan expert at the British headquarters for the Middle East in Cairo. In late 1940 in 
Istanbul, Becker was able to involve a handful of Austrians in subversive British warfare 
– for the first time outside the UK –, including the former Social Affairs Minister Josef 
Dobretsberger and Styrian manufacturer and communist Herbert Feuerlöscher.28 In this 
extremely difficult phase of the fight against Nazi Germany, the SOE agents (especially 
the exiles among them) epitomized an unbroken will to resist, opposed resignation, and in 
doing so communicated a strong position that supported pro-Western partisanship, among 
the refugees and local anti-fascists in particular. Their many years of experience in exile 
in various European countries made them old hands at adapting to new social contexts, 
where they quickly emerged as players – also through the support of their respective Brit-
ish communities. This distinguished them from many Austrian refugees, who had many 
difficulties adapting in the first years after the exodus, be it in Paris, London or Istanbul, 
and were hardly in a position to become offensively involved in the Western war efforts. 
DECONSTRUCTING NATIONAL MYTHS
A closer look at the British documents describing the attempts of Hanau and his man 
in Ljubljana, English lecturer Alexander Lawrenson, to expand the D Section organiza-
tion into the German Reich reveals that they clearly envisaged more than just Carinthia’s 
Slovenian population as a connection.29 From the British point of view, the Slovenian 
activists from the Littoral should primarily target two political camps with pro-Austrian 
propaganda: Socialists and Catholics.30 Lawrenson naturally tried to activate organized 
structures within the highly Catholic-conservative Carinthian Slovenes with the help of 
Juri Felaher, his contact in Ljubljana. The president of the Carinthian Slovenes’ Club/
Klub Koroških Slovenec (KKS) did manage to collect some information for the British 
from Carinthia, though, according to both British and German records, he was unable to 
find any willingness for militant resistance. At that time, Carinthian Slovene representa-
tives were hoping to find a compromise with the Nazi regime (Sima, 2000, 749).31 
28 TNA-HS 9/116/6, PF Oscar Behron, Free Austrians, From D/H98 to D/H31, 6. 12. 1944; cf. Pirker, 2009, 
360.
29 TNA-HS 7/4, History 3A, D section, Slovene Organization; TNA-HS-9/112/4, PF Alfred Becker, From 
Caesar [Hanau] to D. H., 1. 2. 1940; TNA-HS-7/3, D section, Balkans, Early History to September 1940; 
TNA-HS 5/965, D Section, Yugoslavia, Memorandum on successes obtained by Croatian agents and orga-
nizations working for S.O.2.
30 TNA-HS-7/4, History 3A, D section, Slovene Organization.
31 For more detailed information on Felaher see Stergar, 2005.
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The outcome in Carinthia and Styria was more or less the same for Anton Ivančič 
and Ferdo Kravanja, two subversive border-crossers from the TIGR cell in Jesenice. Ap-
proaching the at one-time socialist (since 1934 Communist-leaning) railway men and 
workers in Villach brought no positive results, nor did attempts to tie into the illegal CP’s 
reorganisation in the Klagenfurt area.32 Only Gregor Gabriel, a farmer from Rosental 
close to the border who had ties to the illegal communist leader Kilian Schauss, was 
willing to become more involved in the endeavor. The young "border runner" Alois Knes 
[Knez] from Maria Gail, a relative of Gabriel’s, found trustworthy support among close 
relatives and acquaintances (German and Slovenian-speaking) in his home town. Knes 
had deserted his Wehrmacht barracks in Salzburg over the New Year 1939–1940 and fled 
to Slovenia with the help of Anton Tuder, the village’s formerly socialist mayor.33 Though 
Knes’ supporters certainly stood in the local, anti-fascist tradition of the workers and 
railwaymen milieu, they apparently had no ties to illegal cadres of the Communist Party 
or other underground political contexts, nor did they seem willing to make any. Tuder, 
for example, refused deeper cooperation on several occasions. The same thing happened 
in Upper Styria. Even there – far beyond the mixed-language Carinthian Region – Ferdo 
Kravanja, Anton Ivančič and Alois Knes only succeeded in building a sabotage and es-
pionage cell over personal and familial relations. It consisted of Franz Ivančič, Anton’s 
brother, who lived and worked in Judenburg and his close friend and work colleague 
Engelbert Glitzner, who instigated bombing attacks on the Southern Railway as well as 
several espionage missions. Both were doubtlessly Nazi opponents; Ivančič was a mem-
ber of the christian social home guard in the early 1930s and Glitzner’s sympathies had 
been with the communists since 1934 – without becoming more conspicuous politically. 
Glitzner also failed to secure the hoped-for contacts to communist comrades in the Upper 
Styrian industrial area.
Many decades later, Carinthian historian August Walzl explained the communists’ 
refusal to cooperate as the result of their strong Austrian patriotism. This point of view 
will be addressed in the following, because Walzl’s in many respects problematic work 
on anti-Nazi resistance in Carinthia, Slovenia and Friuli has thus far been the only sys-
tematic, German-language examination of resistance in the Alps-Adriatic region.34 With 
regard to the British and Slovenian involvement, Walzl characterized even the attacks 
themselves – in a complete misrepresentation of Nazi Germany’s expansion politics and 
misunderstanding of the geopolitical context – as the "first foreign intervention" (Walzl, 
1994, 69). Seen in light of this evidently German nationalist lens of interpretation, what is 
even more bizarre is when Walzl tries to argue the communists’ "Austrian consciousness" 
in order to interpret their refusal to cooperate with the Slovenian activists: "In no way did 
32 After the 1934 banning of the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP) and the February defeat by the 
Austrofascist Dollfuss regime, many Socialists turned to the more radical, likewise illegal Austrian Com-
munist Party. This was widely true of the workers’ milieu in Villach.
33 Confirmation of Knes’ desertion can be found in a secret circular letter concerning the combating of treason 
(NARA-RG 242, E 27, B 11, F 173-b-16-12/48, RSHA IV E, Geheimes Sammelrundschreiben über Lan-
desverratsbekämpfung, 15. 10. 1940).
34 With a very strong biographical, less historiographical and scholarly focus cf. Baum, 2010.
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they want to be the henchmen of the Secret Service or Slovene groups and identify with 
their objectives – objectives clearly at odds with their Austrian consciousness, especially 
as they were also unclear as to what the Slovenian interests were" (Walzl, 1994, 72). 
Walzl’s sources included accounts from KPÖ official Josef Nischelwitzer, survivor of 
the Mauthausen concentration camp and longtime editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper 
Volkswille, and Max Muchitsch, who was active in the Upper Styrian partisan group 
Leoben-Donawitz. Looking at these sources however, one notices that neither Nisch-
elwitzer nor Muchitsch cites the involvement of Slovenian activists as the cause of the 
communists’ reserved attitude (KPÖ Kärnten, 1988, 80; Muchitsch 1985, 118). This was 
obviously added by Walzl in order to construct an explanation in accordance with the na-
tional Carinthian historico-political prisma and its notorious focus on Slovenian claims to 
territory. By contrast, British and German documents indicate that the reasons for the low 
appeal of Slovenian activist efforts were political-ideological and not national-political 
in nature. The propaganda smuggled into Carinthia advocated partisanship in favor of the 
Western democracies in the war against Germany.35 This position was in stark contrast to 
the communists’ previous party line, which had been neutral to the "imperialist" war since 
the Hitler-Stalin pact. Schauss’ views reflected this as well; one of his fliers from that time 
reads: "The Austrian and German working classes [...] will not allow themselves to be 
misled by Goebbels’ propaganda of lies from Berlin, but also not from the worshipers of 
the bourgeois democracy of London and Paris".36 The communists’ willingness to attack 
German warfare actively in support of any allied war effort came only after the Nazi inva-
sion of the Soviet Union.
D Section agents responsible for Austria in London also took an Austrian nationalist 
position and made a conscious attempt to cultivate anti-German sentiment with their sub-
versive propaganda (cf. Pirker, 2010, 88). This aspect would also make it seem that Ger-
man judicial records, which indicate an Austrian nationalist slant in circulated fliers of the 
Jesenice TIGR cell, are in fact correct. In no source, nor in the numerous German court 
records, is there any mention that Slovene activists within the German Reich pursued or 
advocated irredentist objectives as they did in the Littoral. Looking at the oral agreement 
between the Slovenian irredentists and Hanau about their subversive cooperation – as 
presented in a 1943 memorandum by Ivan Maria Čok to the Foreign Office – though it 
does mention the merger of Trieste, Gorizia and Istria to Yugoslavia, there is no talk of 
territorial claims to parts of Carinthia.37
Nischelwitzer and Muchitsch used another topos. According to their accounts, the 
Austrian communists repelled the British Secret Service’s attempts to "harness" them 
for British purposes. Yet both authors offered important accounts of the communist re-
sistance against the Nazi regime in Austria. It is therefore worth noting that neither men-
tioned Glitzner’s attacks on the railway and the large Reich Military Court trial in Kla-
35 SDB, Ojs 107/41, Generalstaatsanwalt, Anklageverfügung gegen Gregor Gabriel, 12. 8. 1941.
36 DÖW, a. u. 19793/125, Volksgerichtshof, Verdict against Schauß, Killian among others.
37 TNA-FO 371/37629 R 2619/230/92, Committee of the Yugoslavs from Italy to Anthony Eden, New York, 
28. 3. 1943.
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genfurt against Glitzner, the Slovenian activists Anton Ivančič and Ferdo Kravanja and 
the Maria Gail Group, even though the court denounced and condemned many of them 
as communists.
At the same time, it is problematic to classify the Maria Gail group and the Judenburg 
cell as TIGR activists or to call them the forerunners of a Slovenian autochthonous re-
sistance. Only two arguments can be brought in here: First, Ferdo Kravanja’s and Anton 
Ivančič’s activities within the German Reich were – according to all sources and research 
findings thus far – entirely different from the national political struggle against fascism 
in the Italian coastal region. Second, in as much as they are known, most activities within 
the German Reich were exclusively activities performed on the D Section’s initiative. All 
sabotage, espionage and propaganda activities that appear in the sources and in research 
suggest that they were aiming to develop an "Austrian" organization, to lead Knes and 
other "agents" to Salzburg, Upper Austria and to perform propaganda and sabotage even 
in the "Altreich". Whether these subversive journeys mentioned in British, German and 
Slovenian documents (cf. Jevnikar, 1998, 238) were actually carried out is irrelevant here. 
It at least shows their direction and intention.
It would, however, be inaccurate to speak of an "exploitation" of TIGR by the D Sec-
tion as the cooperation was based on shared interests: weakening the German war effort, 
attacking the connection between Germany, Italy and Yugoslavia, and reinforcing the 
Western democracies’ position in the war. The relationship between the D Section and the 
activists from the coast could be better described as a kind of transnational service for the 
establishment of sabotage and resistance cells in the borderlands of the German Reich, 
an area of operations where locally adept, multilingual "border runners" could act where 
British agents could not.38 In return, they were promised political support for a revision of 
the Italian-Yugoslav border after the war, weapons, ammunition, explosives, and financial 
backing for their particular struggle against the fascist regime in the coastal region. The 
anti-German and anti-fascist resistance in Yugoslavia and northeastern Italy should, in 
following the D Section’s strategies, become inspiring examples for the European coun-
tries threatened by German expansion. It was a transnational anti-fascist work agreement, 
albeit one with a number of structural problems. One of these should be mentioned briefly 
here: The quality of assessments as to the political situation was based on information 
from a scarcely manageable news chain from Jesenice to Ljubljana to Belgrade to Lon-
don – one in which every link had a structural interest in giving positive reports about 
the way work was progressing in order to legitimize its own material needs. Looking, for 
example, at the number of sabotage attacks in Austria claimed by the Balkan Department 
of the D Section in London,39 one notes a glaring discrepancy between that figure and the 
number of attacks German judicial authorities charged members of the sabotage organiza-
38 The first two trained British-Austrian agents to be sent to Yugoslavia by the SOE (the D Section’s successor 
organization) in February 1941 were Theodor Schubauer and Franz Preiss. Schubauer, the Social Demo-
crat, was the former captain of the Vienna Municipal Guard, Preiss, a young Sudeten-German socialist. The 
British ship in which they were traveling was torpedoed off the coast of West Africa; both men drowned
39 TNA-HS 8/214, D Section, Great Britain’s only successful experiment in total warfare, Appendix III.
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tion with.40 Even checking these against other sources, daily newspapers or chronicles, 
for example, one could safely conclude that attacks had been "invented" to prove the ef-
ficiency of the sabotages (cf. Pirker, 2010, 220). Based on this information, the D Section 
gave political decision makers in London not only the impression of working relations 
with a socialist underground and a Slovenian organization in Austria, but also that there 
was potential in Austria for developing militant resistance.41
Although the D Section’s development of a transnational resistance network between 
1938 and 1940 was characterized by many teething problems, this is where the founda-
tion for future cooperation between resistance movements, exile organizations, and allied 
intelligence agencies was laid. These transnational relationships, though successful to 
varying degrees, were essential for espionage, sabotage, guerilla fighting, and building 
escape routes in the struggle against German domination in Europe (Moore, 2000, 8). 
These should become more of a focus in research investigations on resistance, also as a 
means to cast a critical eye on national mythologizing. 
THE TRIAL AT THE REICH MILITARY COURT IN KLAGENFURT
The RSHA’s findings were grounds for several court proceedings in Vienna and Kla-
genfurt against originally thirty-seven indicted individuals of German, Italian and Yugo-
slavian nationality. The primary defendants42 fell under the military jurisdiction that had 
been reintroduced in 1933/34 by the coalition government of National Socialists and Ger-
man Nationalists. In 1939, shortly before the start of the war, a series of special provisions 
such as the Decree Concerning Special Military Crimes during the War (Kriegssonder-
strafrechtsverordnung – KSSVO) and the Decree Concerning Military Jurisdiction dur-
ing the War (Kriegsstrafenverfahrensordnung – KStVO) were introduced as a means of 
drastically tightening and adapting the justice system in accordance with the Wehrmacht 
leadership and adjusting it to suit Nazi ideology. The aim was to nip any doubt and criti-
cism of the war, insufficient sacrifice, desertion, and sabotage of the war effort in the 
bud. Nazi and Wehrmacht leadership considered the military justice’s failure to suppress 
insurgent and mutinying soldiers in 1918 a major cause of Germany’s defeat. Now any 
form of dissent against the war, or any whiff of it, would be harshly persecuted and the 
"Volksgemeinschaft" would be wiped clean of it from the start (cf. Garbe, 2011).43 In July 
1941 in Klagenfurt, at the largest Reich Military Court trial in the "Ostmark" to date, 
40 In addition to the cited judicial records, evidence of this is also found in situation reports from the NS judi-
ciary in Austria (Form, Uthe, 2004, 336).
41 TNA-HS 8/214, D section, Foreign Organisations, with which this section is in contact, n.d. [summer 
1940].
42 Engelbert Glitzner, Franz and Anton Ivančič, Ferdo Kravanja, Franz and Anna Knes, Konrad Lipusch, 
Martin Čemernjak, Franz Melcher, Josef and Maria Reiterer, Anna Glitzner, Leopoldine Schnedl, Theresia 
Knes (cf. SDB, a. u. StPL (RKA) I 118/41, Reichskriegsgericht, Anklageverfügung gegen Engelbert Glitz-
ner u. a. 25. 6. 1941).
43 The Wehrmacht military court gave a total 25,000 to 30,000 death sentences, of which 18,000 to 22,000 
were carried out. For more detailed information on the numbers, see Messerschmidt, 2005, 168, 453.
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Senate President Karl Schmauser sentenced six defendants to death, the others to several 
years of prison. Two of the activists the RSHA held most responsible for the sabotage 
organization were on the run: Alois Knes and Ferdo Kravanja. 
One striking feature of the charges and judgment certificates is that the rulings are not 
based on proof of certain, concrete actions, but on the assessment of a political attitude. 
The entire organization was deemed communist by the court, though an examination of 
Anton and Franz Ivančič as well as Ferdo Kravanja’s biographies showed no evidence of 
communist leanings. The Reichkriegsgericht (RKG) classified several of the Carinthian 
defendants as fanatical communists all the more. For the court, the communist classifica-
tion was considered complete proof of the individual’s full participation in acts of sabo-
tage. What mattered to the court was the endeavor – in other words the will, the intention 
or a so-called inner consent to the act. And in the event of a communist attitude, this was 
considered to be a given.44 The construction of a communist sentiment in Anton Ivančič 
was the cause of considerable difficulty in a subsequent trial at the Volksgerichtshof, 
when the judges tried to explain the failed cooperation between him and Anton Tuder, 
who had also been called a communist.45 The prosecutor also identified Konrad Lipusch 
and the parents of Alois Knes as Slovenes; this clearly pejorative attribution was at first 
missing in Martin Čemernjak’s record, though the evidence of his Slovenian native lan-
guage was added to his sentence later. The fact that Franz Knes and Konrad Lipusch had 
been decorated many times in the First World War and had voluntarily participated in the 
struggle against Yugoslav forces in the border conflict in 1919 did little to help them.46 
Wherever it could, the court also stressed the defendants’ alleged "anti-social" and infe-
rior natures, which were deemed detrimental to the "Volksgemeinschaft". In general, the 
Reich Military Court – shortly after the start of the attack on the Soviet Union – sought 
to represent the sabotage organization as a communist enterprise organized by Yugoslav 
and British secret intelligence agencies under command of the "English Jew Hanau", 
with the aim of "paving the way for a coup and undermining the resilience of the German 
people".47
The nature of the charge reflects the ideological delusion of Nazism: a secret alliance 
between Western democracies and communism, masterminded by Jews to annihilate the 
Germans. In comparision with the "Special Tribunal for the Security of the State" in 
Trieste in December 1941, which was conducted at least partly in order to prosecute 
sabotage attacks commited in 1940 by TIGR activists, there are a number of interesting 
differences (cf. Verginella, 2000, 157). Like the Reich Military Court, the fascist tribunal 
took similar pains to emphasize the connections and cooperation between the clearly po-
44 SDB, a. u. StPL (HLS) III 57/41 – StPL (RKA) I 118/41, Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil gegen Engelbert 
Glitzner u. a., 25. 7. 1941, 42.
45 SDB, a. u. Urteil 2H 3/42 – 6J 101/41g, Volksgerichtshof, Urteil gegen Franz Monsberger und Anton Tuder.
46 SDB, a. u. StPL (RKA) I 118/41, Reichskriegsgericht, Anklageverfügung gegen Engelbert Glitzner u. a. 25. 
6. 1941, 17.
47 SDB, a. u. StPL (RKA) I 118/41, Reichskriegsgericht, Anklageverfügung gegen Engelbert Glitzner u. a. 25. 
6. 1941, 9, 23, 51; a. u. StPL (HLS) III 57/41 – StPL (RKA) I 118/41, Reichskriegsgericht, Feldurteil gegen 
Engelbert Glitzner u. a., 25. 7. 1941, 11, 37.
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litically, organizationally and socially heterogeneous defendants and to attribute these to 
a "single organizational mind".48 Unlike the Reich Military Court, the Trieste trial did not 
forefront communism as the primary enemy. Instead it trotted out irredentism, Slovenian 
exiles in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav government, and the British "Intelligence Service" as 
the unifying elements. Though the Klagenfurt trial had no charges related to any irre-
dentist agendas, they were the main focus of the trials in Trieste. While the Nazi press in 
Carinthia did not report on the Reich Military Court (probably to prevent worry about the 
strength of the "home front" during the Wehrmacht advances in the Soviet Union) Italy’s 
fascist government staged the military tribunal as a show trial that was heavily covered 
by the media – even within the German Reich (Kärntner Grenzruf, 17. 12. 1941). There 
could have been three reasons for this: firstly, to demonstrate the fascist regime’s strength, 
secondly, the tribunal was to have a deterrent effect on the Slovenian population. A third 
element may have been an interest in attuning the Italian population to war against Great 
Britain for supremacy in the Mediterranean.49
In the "Ostmark", it was the business of the SS Sicherheitsdienst (SD) to connect lead-
ing Carinthian Slovenes to the sabotage organization. As early as July 1940, even before 
the results of the RSHA investigations were available, the SD identified the "national 
Slovenian clergy" and the Slovenian Cultural Association as responsible for the attacks. 
They had, according to the SD, "created the mindset required to commit these kind of 
sabotage".50 In response, the SD demanded to break their influence and strengthen their 
control of Slovenian youth.
POLITICS OF MEMORY OR: THE LONG PATH FROM OSTRACISM TO REHA-
BILITATION
In conclusion, I would like to shed some light on how postwar societies in Austria 
and Slovenia have dealt with the history of this early transnational sabotage organization. 
The following begins with a brief comparison of the politics of memory, in other words 
the question as to how this early anti-fascist and anti-Nazi resistance was and is thought 
of today and how it has been interpreted. Several historians have pointed out in recent 
years that the early liberal-national resistance in the Littoral was devalued in socialist 
Slovenia on account of its connection with the Western powers. Instead, activists from 
TIGR and later cooperators in Western military missions in Slovenia were denounced 
and sometimes persecuted as "agents" and "spies". Some of them had already been 
liquidated by the Yugoslav secret police (OZNA) in 1945 (Bajc, Torkar, 2009; Bajc, 2007, 
Deželak-Barič, 2000; Earle, 2005). The politics of memory followed, to some extent, the 
48 TNA-371/37629 R 2619/230/92, Commentary on Trieste-Trial against 71 Slovenes over Radio Rome, 10. 
12. 1941 by Rino Alessi, official Fascist commentator.
49 TNA-371/37629 R 2619/230/92, Commentary on Trieste-Trial against 71 Slovenes over Radio Rome, 10. 
12. 1941 by Rino Alessi, official Fascist commentator.
50 SDB, Meldungen aus dem Reich (Nr. 107), 22. 7. 1942. Originally published in: Boberach, 1984, 1402–
1412.
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tendency during the liberation struggle to subordinate non-communist anti-fascism to the 
dominance of the Communist Party of Slovenia (KPS) within the Liberation Front of the 
Slovene People (Osvobodilna fronta).
The situation in Austria was a different one altogether. As we know, there was no 
anti-Nazi resistance in Austria that came close to the liberation movement in Slovenia. 
The memory politics in Austria were however similar, if under different circumstances. 
Here, the lack of denazification, the swift return of former Nazis to public and political 
life, as well as the rapid restoration of anti-Slavic German nationalism (cf. Knight, 2007) 
led – after a short phase of capitalizing on the resistance in international negotiations on 
the future of Austria – to the situation, that the executed resistance fighters and victims 
of Nazi persecution were hardly being commemorated at all. Instead, the honors went al-
most exclusively to the fallen soldiers of the Wehrmacht. The initiative for this came from 
veterans of the Wehrmacht, who glorified their military service in an attempt to compen-
sate for the humiliation of defeat. The repression of addressing criminal warfare came as 
an emphasis on supposedly timeless soldierly values of "fulfillment of duty", "honor", 
"obedience", and "loyalty". Though its principles ran counter to the official representa-
tion of the Austrians as victims of Nazi Germany, the veteran’s view of history quickly 
became hegemonial. But their public celebration required a few semantic shifts: The fight 
for Nazi Germany became a struggle for the "homeland," the war of attack became a war 
of defense (Manoschek, 2010, 36).
In Carinthia especially, the memory of the Second World War was associated with 
the so-called "Abwehrkampf" (the national border struggle following the First World 
War), and emphasized the continuity of a necessary anti-Slav struggle in defense of the 
"Heimat". The handling of those executed and murdered for belonging to the "sabotage 
and terrorist organization in Ostmark" is a characteristic example. In Maria Gail, a dis-
pute started over the question about which dead from the time between 1939 and 1945 
should be publicly honored and commemorated in the form of a monument. One group of 
Wehrmacht veterans belonging to the right wing Federation of Independents (WdU, later 
FPÖ) advocated that the monument be dedicated only to the fallen soldiers of the First 
World War, those of the "Abwehrkampf," the Second World War and the civilian victims 
of the allied bombing attacks, while socialists and communists argued for an "anti-war 
memorial" that would also bear the names of resistance fighters and victims of Nazism. 
The Wehrmacht veterans rejected the latter on the grounds that they could not at all be 
portrayed as heroes and freedom fighters (Volkswille, 9. 8. 1953).
The veterans were finally able to erect the planned war memorial with support from 
the ÖVP, the christian democratic Austrian People’s Party. One of the two speakers at 
the unveiling was the former SS Sturmbannführer Karl Fritz, who in 1940 as head of the 
Abwehr substation in Klagenfurt was responsible for tracking the TIGR activists and their 
supporters in Maria Gail. In his speech, Fritz – now the People’s Party candidate for a 
mandate in the Carinthian state parliament – gave particular praise to the voluntary com-
batants of the "Abwehrkampf" from 1919, to whom – which he did not mention – Franz 
Knes and Konrad Lipusch also belonged – two Nazi opponents who had been decapitated 
due to Fritz’s police work for the Nazi regime. Fritz closed his speech with a word of 
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praise to the "iron resolve in the performance of duty" and the "loyalty to the home-
land and its people". The word "Austria" is never mentioned in his address: He spoke of 
Carinthia and the goal of a united Europe – which was nothing more than a cipher for the 
very same German anti-communist hegemony on the continent already advocated in Nazi 
Germany. The second speaker was the WdU-representative Hans Rohr. Photographs of 
the ceremony show him proudly wearing the Knight’s Cross and other Wehrmacht medals 
on his breast. His speech was clearly directed against the former war opponents, whom 
he blamed for the bombing attacks and accused of revenge justice. In allusion to desert-
ers and resistance fighters, he spoke of "traitors" on the home front and declared: "Today 
we know exactly where the decorum lies, with treason or with loyalty, and no one will 
doubt the sanctity of the oath again" (Allgemeine Bauern-Zeitung, 15. 8. 1953). For the 
veterans’ associations – the Austrian Comrades Association (Österreichischer Kamerad-
schaftsbund – ÖKB) with hundreds of thousands of members, for example – the defama-
tion of resistance fighters and Wehrmacht deserters as scoundrels, criminals, traitors and 
perjurers served to bolster their own positive identity building, and the restoration of their 
soldierly masculinity.
Though the hegemony of this ultimately positive reference to the Second World War 
was questioned in the wake of 1986 discussion about Kurt Waldheim and his "fulfillment 
of duty in the Wehrmacht", it was not shaken. This only occured later with the exhibition 
"War of Extermination. Crimes of the Wehrmacht", which was shown several times in 
Austria throughout the mid-1990s. The exhibition was furthermore an occasion to reas-
sess National Socialism, particularly on the level of non-governmental, social and local 
initiatives. This reassessment was also crucial for the change in the way the Maria Gail 
group was remembered. At this stage, on private initiative of the association "Erinnern" 
in Villach, the first complete list of the Maria Gail residents executed for "treason and 
high treason" or murdered by the Nazis in concentration camps and prisons was com-
piled (Lauritsch, 1994). Five years later, the same society realized its plan to list all those 
persecuted by the Nazi regime from Villach and the vicinity on a monument in the city 
center. In other words, it took over four decades to end the ostracism of Maria Gail mur-
dered anti-fascists’ from public and cultural memory. In the case of the Styrian sabouteur 
Engelbert Glitzner, this form of public and cultural commemoration is still nonexistent. 
He has slipped completely into obscurity, despite his being one of the first militant resis-
tance fighters in Austria. On the official political level, it was only in October 2009 that 
the Austrian Parliament – after many years of discussion and public pressure emerging 
with the exhibition "Was damals Recht war… Soldaten und Zivilisten vor Gerichten der 
Wehrmacht" – unambiguously rehabilitated all of the soldiers and civilians sentenced by 
the Wehrmacht judicial system (cf. Metzler, 2010).
Comparing the date of full rehabilitation in Austria with the course of the discussion 
on the rehabilitation of the TIGR and members of the Western parachute missions in post-
socialist Slovenia, it is clear that it took Austria several years longer to completely end 
the discrimination after 1945. In Slovenia, the activists of the TIGR were rehabilitated 
in 1997 by the then President Milan Kučan. It should be noted, however, that recourse 
to the TIGR was within the context of a specific national historico-political discourse: a 
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positive contrast to the Communist-dominated Liberation Front, which is burdened with 
the massacre of collaborators after the war. In a 2005 commemoration ceremony by lib-
eral-conservative Prime Minister Janez Janša TIGR, was portrayed as prime, in a certain 
sense, "untainted" element of the anti-fascist liberation struggle. In a kind of fictitious 
view of history, it serves to preserve the importance of the national liberation struggle and 
to wish away the social revolution associated with it. In the words of Janez Janša: "TIGR 
is what the partisan movement would have been without the communist dominance in the 
struggle against the occupier" (Janša, 2005). Thus, the analysis of the politics of memory 
is always the analysis of predominant wishful thinking about the course of history.
NADNACIONALNI ODPOR V PROSTORU ALPE-JADRAN V 
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POVZETEK 
Začenši s kratko razpravo o poskusih britanske obveščevalne službe MI6, da bi s 
sabotažami in subverzijami odgovorila na nemško geopolitično nadvlado v Jugoslaviji v 
letih 1939/40, prispevek opredeljuje organizacijsko strukturo teh prizadevanj kot nadna-
cionalno prevratniško mrežo, v katero je vključena cela vrsta različnih akterjev: državno 
vodene obveščevalne službe, nedržavna kulturna združenja, povezana z ilegalnimi 
političnimi skupinami, intelektualci in novinarji, politični aktivisti v izgnanstvu, begunci 
in dezerterji, pa tudi posamezniki, ki so prizadevanja podpirali preprosto iz prijateljskih 
ali sorodstvenih razlogov. Kljub temu da so prehajali državne meje in se povezovali z 
antifašisti iz različnih narodnostnih skupnosti na področju Alpe-Jadran, pa je za večino 
organiziranih aktivistov nacionalna država ostajala glavni referenčni okvir in objekt nji-
hove lojalnosti.
V prispevku avtor izpostavi posebno vlogo, ki sta jo dva nemška socialdemokrata, Ja-
kob Altmeier in Alfred Becker, lahko odigrala, zahvaljujoč svojim dolgoletnim političnim 
in poklicnim izkušnjam ter raznolikim stikom in jezikovnim veščinam, ki sta jih od leta 
1933 pridobivala v izgnanstvu. Tovrstna iznajdljivost, tipična za intelektualce, novi-
narje in dopisnike, je bila ključnega pomena za ustvarjanje nadnacionalnih odporniških 
mrež. Altmaier in Becker sta delovala kot predstavnika za stike za sekcijo D v srbskih, 
hrvaških in slovenskih protinemških in protifašističnih krogih in sta bila odgovorna za 
izdajo časopisov in letakov, ki so med drugim nagovarjali tudi nemške manjšine v Jugo-
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slaviji ter socialdemokrate in katolike v Avstriji. V izjemno težki fazi boja proti nacistični 
Nemčiji so nemški izgnanci, kot sta bila Altmaier in Becker, poosebljali nezlomljivo voljo 
do upora, nasprotovali predaji in s tem izražali odločno držo, ki je podpirala prozahodno 
privrženost, zlasti med begunci in lokalnimi antifašisti. 
Druga skupina aktivistov, ki jih avtor obravnava v prispevku, je bila skupina lokalnih 
antifašistov in dezerterjev iz wehrmachta v avstrijskih deželah Koroške in Štajerske, ki 
je izvedla tri napade na nemške državne železnice (Reichsbahn). V sabotersko mrežo 
se je skupina povezala preko aktivistov slovenske narodno-liberalne ilegalne organi-
zacije TIGR. Ti stiki so se večinoma razvili iz osebnih in družinskih vezi, saj čezmejnim 
tigrovcem ni uspelo vzpostaviti trdnih povezav s slovensko manjšino na Koroškem in 
tudi ne s komunistično ilegalo. Po predhodnih interpretacijah naj bi bile slovenske oze-
meljske zahteve in močan avstrijski patriotizem razloga, zakaj koroška levičarska ilegala 
ni hotela sodelovati s tigrovci. Toda pozorno branje ene do študij Osrednjega urada za 
državno varnost (RSHA) ter dokumentov z nemških sodnih procesov in iz MI6 razkrivajo, 
da take interpretacije temeljijo bolj na specifični časovno-odvisni politični miselnosti, ki 
je prevladovala v Avstriji, kot pa na dokazih iz zgodovinskih dokumentov, saj ti kažejo, 
da so se v letih 1939/40 koroški Slovenci bolj prilagajali situaciji, kot pa si prizadevali 
za vojaški odpor, medtem ko so komunisti so v "imperialistični" vojni med Nemčijo in 
zahodnimi demokraciji zavzeli nevtralno stališče. Da je šlo za posebno vrsto političnega 
in ideološkega izkoriščanja, je razvidno že iz tega, kako so nacistični sodniki prikazovali 
sabotersko mrežo na wehrmachtovem vojaškem sodišču v Celovcu julija 1941, kmalu 
po nemškem napadu na Sovjetsko zvezo. Čeprav sodniki pri številnih obtoženih niso 
mogli dokazati levičarske usmeritve, so si izmislili skrivno zavezništvo med zahodnimi 
demokracijami in komunizmom, ki naj bi ga usmerjali Židi, da bi napadli Nemce. Šest 
obtožencev je bilo obsojenih na smrt, dva sta umrla v zaporu oziroma v koncentracijskem 
taborišču. Istočasno je esesovska varnostna služba (SS Sicherheitsdienst) "nacionalno 
slovensko duhovščino" in Slovensko kulturno zvezo okrivila teh napadov, da bi okrepila 
pritisk na slovensko manjšino. 
V zadnjem poglavju avtor pojasnjuje, kako je po letu 1945 koroškim nacionalsocial-
istom uspelo javno razglasiti usmrčene antifašiste za izdajalce. Več desetletij je bilo pre-
povedano obeleževati spomin na te prve antifašistične aktiviste, preživele pa so utišali. 
Koncem devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja so lokalna kulturna združenja, kot je "Erin-
nern Villach" ("Beljak se spominja"), premagala postnacistični ostrakizem. Na uradni 
politični ravni se je to zgodilo šele oktobra 2009, ko je avstrijski parlament enoznačno re-
habilitiral vse avstrijske vojake in civiliste, obsojene na wehrmachtovih vojaških sodiščih. 
Ključne besede: MI6, SOE, TIGR, nemško izgnanstvo, Avstrija, koroški Slovenci, 
odporništvo, predvojna Jugoslavija, politike iz preteklosti
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